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This is a tale about predictions of dire consequences that have yet to
occur-and likely never will. North Carolina became the thirty-first state
to define marriage as involving only opposite-sex couples on May 8, 2012,
when voters approved the following amendment to the state constitution:
Marriage between one man and one woman is the only domestic legal
union that shall be valid or recognized in this State. This section does
not prohibit a private party from entering into contracts with another
private party; nor does this section prohibit courts from adjudicating the
rights of private parties pursuant to such contracts.
* Associate Professor, Campbell University School of Law. I am grateful to my
colleagues Dick Bowser, Lynn Buzzard, and William Woodruff for their comments on
earlier drafts of this article. I also thank my research assistant, Thom Robbins, for his
valuable help on the article. The views expressed herein are mine alone, as are any
errors.
1. N.C. CONsT. art. XIV, § 6. The amendment was approved by a vote of
1,317,178 to 840,802 (61% to 39%). See Election Results State of North Carolina,
N.C. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS,
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/NC/36596/85942/en/summary.html (last visited
Aug. 9, 2013).
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There was much disagreement prior to the vote about the meaning and
potential legal effects of this provision.2 Like the fabled character Chicken
Little, who believes the sky is falling after being hit by a single acorn from
the tree above, opponents proclaimed that the Amendment would have
"harmful unintended consequences" that would affect "hundreds of
thousands of families across our state."3 In their view, the Amendment not
only would ban same-sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic
partnerships, but also would threaten a wide range of legal benefits and
protections given to all unmarried couples, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, including existing domestic violence and child custody,
adoption, and visitation laws.4 They claimed that the Amendment would
"harm children" by taking away their health insurance benefits.5 They
predicted that the Amendment's vague language would lead to a flood of
litigation-as one family law attorney promised, "[w]hat we're buying for
North Carolina is hundreds and hundreds of lawsuits."6
More than a year has passed since voters approved North Carolina's
Marriage Amendment. There has been no litigation over the meaning of
2. See J.D. Walker, Legal Experts Debate the Impact of Amendment One,
COURIER TRIB. (May 2, 2012), http://courier-tribune.com/sections/news/local/legal-
experts-debate-impact-amendment-one.html.
3. Vote Against Amendment One, COAL. TO PROTECT N.C. FAMILIES,
http://www.protectallncfamilies.org/sites/protectncfamilies/files/AllOneSheet_01_06.p
df (last visited Jul. 21, 2013). Opponents of the Amendment typically referred to it as
"Amendment One" because it was the first (and only) proposed amendment on the
ballot.
4. For descriptions of the amendment's supposed far-reaching effects, see David
Donovan, Amendment One's Vague Language, N.C. LAW WKLY (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://nclawyersweekly.com/2012/04/20/amendment-one-vague-language; Michael
Hewlett, Marriage Amendment Would Affect Many People, Panel Says, WINsTON-
SALEM J. (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/article_376215af-
11a5-52fb-b9d3-24efel5ad7cb.html; Craig Jarvis, Marriage Amendment Debate
Focuses on Domestic Violence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 4, 2012),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/03/04/1902872/marriage-amendment-debate-
focuses.html; Lila Shapiro, Same-Sex Marriage: North Carolina's Proposed Ban,
Amendment One, Could Create 'Legal Chaos', HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/09/-same-sex-marriage-north-carolina-
amendment- 1_n_1408756.html; Thomas Stackpole, Why North Carolina's Anti-Gay
Marriage Amendment Could Be Just as Bad for Straight Couples, NEW REPUBLIC (May
7, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/103119/north-carolina-gay-
marriage.
5. Questions and Answers, COAL. TO PROTECT N.C. FAMILIES,
http://www.protectncfamilies.org/sites/protectncfamilies/files/PNCFConverstations_Q
uestionsAndAnswers.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
6. Hewlett, supra note 4 (quoting Elise M. Whitley, Tash & Kurtz Family Law
Attorneys, Winston-Salem, N.C.).
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the Amendment-not one of the "hundreds and hundreds" of lawsuits
anticipated by Amendment opponents has been filed. No court has
withheld or invalidated a domestic violence protection order because of the
Amendment. No insurance benefits have been withdrawn from domestic
partners and their children. So far, the doomsday predictions of the
Marriage Amendment opponents have failed to materialize. The sky has
not fallen.'
This Article examines the meaning and legal effects of the controversial
North Carolina Marriage Amendment. My aim is two-fold: first, to explain
why claims about the Amendment's far-ranging consequences were never
likely to occur in North Carolina; and, second, to provide a guide for
resolving Amendment-related legal issues should they arise in litigation in
North Carolina or other states with (or considering) similar amendments.
The first section discusses the debate over the Amendment prior to its
adoption, with a particular focus on the arguments made by legal
academics about the Amendment's meaning and potential effects. The
second section examines the language of the Amendment and considers the
meaning and scope of key terms such as "domestic legal union."9 The third
section addresses the Amendment's application to domestic violence
protections, domestic partner benefits provided by public employers,
custody and visitation laws for unmarried parents, granting domestic
partners property through a will or trust, hospital visitation privileges,
emergency medical decisions, and end-of-life decisions-areas that
Amendment opponents predicted would be significantly affected.10
This Article is not about gay marriage. My view of gay marriage has
7. After the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013), the constitutionality of the North Carolina Marriage Amendment has been
challenged in Fisher-Borne v. Smith, No. 1:12-cv-589 (M.D. N.C. filed June 13, 2012).
Fisher-Borne was filed in June 2012 challenging the constitutionality of North
Carolina's ban on second-parent adoptions. On July 9, 2013, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) asked North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper to
consent to the filing of an amended complaint adding the additional claim challenging
the state's ban on same-sex marriage. See Fisher-Borne v. Smith, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/1gbt-rights/fisher-bome-v-smith (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
Cooper agreed and the district court allowed the complaint to be amended to include
the challenge to the Amendment's constitutionality. See N.C. Attorney General
Consents to ACLUAmending Lawsuit to Challenge State's Ban on Marriage for Same-
Sex Couples, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/nc-attorney-general-consents-
aclu-amending-lawsuit-challenge-states-ban-marriage-same (last visited Aug. 19,
2013).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
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little to do with the legal arguments advanced by Amendment opponents,
because those arguments were not about the merits of gay marriage, civil
unions, or domestic partnerships-rather, they concerned the broader legal
consequences of the Amendment once approved." There was much to be
gained by an honest and forthright public discussion of marriage equality
preceding the Amendment vote. Legal academics, along with their fellow
Amendment opponents, chose to frame the debate about the Amendment's
supposed "unintended consequences" for all unmarried couples. That
strategy was designed to appeal broadly to the self-interest and emotion of
voters-especially unmarried heterosexual couples-who might not
otherwise favor gay marriage.12 The strategy ultimately failed and ended
up distorting public debate about the real effects of the Amendment.
I. THE AMENDMENT DEBATE
Throughout the year preceding the vote, legal academics confirmed
predictions of the Amendment's broad "unintended consequences." Three
faculty members at the University of North Carolina School of Law,
including Maxine Eichner, a prominent family law expert, issued a white
paper declaring that the Amendment "is significantly broader than marriage
amendments that have been passed in other states" and detailed how it
would restrict legal benefits and protections for all unmarried couples-
both heterosexual and homosexual-including laws involving domestic
violence, child custody and visitation, financial decisions, disposition of a
deceased partner's remains, hospital visitation, and emergency medical
decisions.' 3  Professor Eichner frequently spoke out against the
Amendment on these grounds, both while it was under consideration in the
11. While I favor opposite-sex marriage, my views are more complicated than can
be explained here.
12. For an extended description of the political strategy by Amendment opponents
to emphasize the Amendment's "unintended consequences," see Karen Ocamb,
Celinda Lake: North Carolina Anti-Amendment-One Win Could Change the LGBT
Rights Movement Forever, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karen-ocamb/celinda-lake-amendment-
one b_1392539.html.
13. See Maxine Eichner et al., Potential Legal Impact of the Proposed Domestic
Legal Union Amendment to the North Carolina Constitution, U. OF N.C. SCH. OF L. 1
(Nov. 8, 2011) (not formally published manuscript), available at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/faculty/marriageamendment/dlureportnov8.pdf
[hereinafter "Eichner Paper"]. Similar arguments were raised in a legal memorandum
produced in 2006 by Arnold & Porter, LLP, regarding the proposed Virginia marriage
amendment. See Melissa Glidden, Brenda Jackson-Cooper & Leslie Nickel, Potential
Impact of the Proposed Marshall/Newman Amendment to the Virginia Constitution
(Aug. 11, 2006) (unpublished legal memorandum) (on file with author).
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North Carolina legislature and once it was placed on the ballot. 14 Shannon
Gilreath, a law professor at Wake Forest University School of Law,
similarly announced that "the reality is that more heterosexuals will be
affected by this amendment than homosexuals."' 5 He explained:
Amendment One will first mean that unmarried heterosexuals receiving
partner benefits from public employees can no longer receive those
benefits ....
Amendment One also limits your ability to contract around marriage
should you choose to do so. So let's imagine that Bob and Sue love each
other and live together for many years but do not marry. Nevertheless,
they want to execute agreements about how their assets will be divided
should their relationship end. Currently, under North Carolina law, they
can do so. If Amendment One becomes law, it is likely that they cannot.
Similarly, Bob may want to give Sue his health care power of attomey.
Currently, he can do so. After Amendment One, he cannot.
Or let us imagine that Bob and Sue have lived together for many years
and Bob wants to leave Sue a piece of property in his will, perhaps the
very house they shared during their lives together. Let's also imagine
that Bob has relatives who would like to have his house after he dies.
Currently, these relatives would have a difficult time setting aside Bob's
bequest to Sue. But in a North Carolina where Amendment One is law,
Bob's relatives need only claim that Bob made his bequest to Sue
because he loved her. A court could then void the bequest because it
was the result of a domestic union that was not a marriage, the
recognition of which would violate North Carolina's (new) public policy.
In this new North Carolina, Bob would have an easier time leaving his
house to his cat than to the woman he loved.
These scenarios may seem absurd to you; yet this is the North Carolina
that Amendment One's legislative supporters are trying to create.' 6
Family law professors from every law school in North Carolina issued a
collective statement declaring that "[b]ased on our professional expertise,
the language of the proposed North Carolina amendment is vague and
untested, and threatens harms to a broad range of North Carolina
families."17 Their statement explained:
14. See, e.g., Stackpole, supra note 4; College Park Baptist Church, Dr. Maxine
Eichner, UNC School of Law, Legal Harms of Amendment One, YOuTUBE (Apr. 17,
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqDsQhijv00&; Progressive Pulse, UNC
Law Professor Maxine Eichner on the Proposed Constitutional Marriage Amendment,
YouTUBE (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-SXHc-JDQzXM.
15. Shannon Gilreath, Op-Ed., It Goes Way Beyond Marriage, NEWS & OBSERVER
(May 3, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/05/03/2039424/it-goes-way-
beyond-marriage.html.
16. Id.
17. Statement from Family Law Professors, COAL. TO PROTECT N.C. FAMILIES
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The amendment is phrased more broadly than most similar amendments
in other states, and would therefore likely be construed by courts more
broadly than in other states. The amendment would certainly ban same-
sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships, and would very
likely ban the domestic partnership health insurance benefits that a
number of municipalities and counties currently offer to same- and
opposite-sex unmarried couples. It also threatens a range of other
protections for unmarried partners and their children, including domestic
violence protections and child custody law.18
Opponents predicted that passage of the Amendment would produce
much litigation and massive legal uncertainty. North Carolina Attorney
General Roy Cooper released a statement opposing the Amendment in
which he declared that "Amendment One's lack of clarity will also result in
a significant amount of litigation on many issues that will be decided by
courts for years to come."19 Russell M. Robinson II, a prominent Charlotte
attorney, claimed that the proposed Amendment's language was "so
absurdly broad and unclear" that "[i]t will undoubtedly provoke multiple
lawsuits to determine what it means."20 Chris Fitzsimon, director of the
progressive North Carolina Policy Watch, predicted that "[a]t the very
least, it will mean that our courts will be tied up for years trying to figure
out what this law means for domestic violence cases." 21
The North Carolina Constitutional Amendments Publication
Commission, made up of the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and
Legislative Services Officer, issued an "official explanation" of the
proposed Amendment, as required by law.2 2  The explanation echoed
concerns raised by Amendment opponents:
The term "domestic legal union" used in the amendment is not defined in
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.protectncfamilies.org/news/nc-family-law-professors-
speak-out-against-amendment-one.
18. Id.
19. Craig Jarvis, Cooper Says He'll Vote Against Marriage Amendment, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://projects.newsobserver.com/under thedome/cooper says hell voteagainst mar
riage amendment (quoting Roy Cooper).
20. Russell M. Robinson II, Op-Ed., A Deeply Flawed Marriage Amendment:
Same-Sex Ban Would Be Vulnerable in Federal Court, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER (Mar.
29, 2012), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/03/29/3134106/marriage-
amendment-invites-legal.html.
21. Tom Kludt, Beyond Gay Marriage: North Carolina Amendment Carries
Massive Implications, TALKING POINTs MEMO (Apr. 10, 2012, 6:22 AM),
http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/04/north-carolina-gay-marriage-
amendment.php (quoting Chris Fitzsimon).
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-54.10 (2012).
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North Carolina law. There is debate among legal experts about how this
proposed constitutional amendment may impact North Carolina law as it
relates to unmarried couples of same or opposite sex and same sex
couples legally married in another state, particularly in regard to
employment-related benefits for domestic partners; domestic violence
laws; child custody and visitation rights; and end-of-life arrangements.
The courts will ultimately make those decisions.23
Amendment supporters countered that the proposed Amendment should
not affect legal protections for unmarried heterosexual couples, but only
would forbid same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.
According to the North Carolina Values Coalition, the legal effect of the
Amendment would be to "recognize the pre-existing institution of marriage
by making it part of the NC Constitution, placing it beyond the power of a
court to redefine or overturn. It would also prevent the creation of
marriage substitutes, such as domestic partnerships or civil unions."2 4
Representative Paul Stam, the House Majority Leader in the North Carolina
General Assembly and a principal sponsor of the legislation that put the
proposed Amendment on the ballot, declared in a press release that he was
"amazed" at the "baseless" claims made by opponents that the Amendment
would affect the enforcement of state domestic violence laws, nullify
medical powers of attorney, and determine child custody and visitation
rights for unmarried parents.25 Vote FOR Marriage N.C. released a video
23. N.C. Dep't of Sec'y of State, Official Explanation Adopted by the NC
Constitutional Amendments Publication Commission for the Proposed Marriage
Amendment to the NC Constitution (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/NCConstitution/thencconstitution2012.aspx. For a
report on the reactions of amendment supporters and opponents to the explanation, see
Craig Jarvis, Both Sides Criticize Official Explanation of Proposed Marriage
Amendment, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/03/02/1897704/both-sides-criticize-official.html.
Secretary of State Elaine Marshall declared her opposition to the proposed amendment
on April 17, 2012. See Elaine Marshall, Amendment One Is an Ill-Conceived &
Dangerous Idea, TwITTER (Apr. 17, 2012, 7:46 AM),
https://twitter.com/Elaine4NC/status/192262777417633792. Attorney General Roy
Cooper announced his opposition on April 25, 2012. See Jarvis, supra note 19.
24. Protect Marriage, N.C. VALUES COAL., http://ncvalues.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Issue-Brief-2.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2013).
25. Press Release, Paul Stam, What Will the Marriage Amendment Do? (Feb. 7,
2012), http://www.nchouserepublicanleader.com/2012/02/07/what-will-the-marriage-
amendment-do. During House committee debate on the proposed amendment,
Representative Stam distributed a memorandum prepared by Austin Nimocks of the
Alliance Defense Fund (now Alliance Defending Freedom) explaining the meaning of
the amendment and its impact on private business and contracts. House Committee
Considers Marriage Amendment (WRAL-TV news broadcast Sept. 12, 2011),
available athttp://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/video/10115310/#/vidl0115310
2013] 7
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advertisement just prior to the election claiming that Amendment
opponents were trying to "scare voters with false claims" and emphasized
that the proposed Amendment "does one thing: it protects marriage as the
union of one man and one woman just as God designed it."2 6
Several weeks before the vote, two of my law school colleagues and I
published a white paper explaining why a dispassionate analysis of
applicable law and other states' experiences with marriage amendments did
not support concerns about the Amendment's "unintended consequences"
raised by its opponents.27 Our paper did not endorse or oppose the
proposed Amendment, but rather encouraged a "robust public debate"
about the issues, emphasized that "it is not up to us to tell anyone how to
vote on the proposed Amendment," and explained that we wanted voters to
have accurate legal information "so that they can properly consider the
,,28Amendment's pros and cons and then vote their conscience. We
suggested that while there are "thoughtful arguments on both sides" of the
marriage equality controversy, the Marriage Amendment debate in North
Carolina had been distorted by fears about certain legal consequences that
were unlikely to occur.29 We urged voters to compare our legal analysis to
the Eichner Paper and family law professors' statements, and then decide
for themselves which arguments were more sensible. 30  Amendment
opponents responded mostly with charges of bias and challenges to our
(0:40-1:12). For a copy of the memorandum, see Memorandum from Alliance Defense
Fund to N.C. House Majority Leader Paul Stam (Sept. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.adfiedia.org/files/NC-MarriageAmendmentExplained.pdf. The
Fayetteville Observer later explained in a news story that "Stam, the Raleigh lawmaker,
said that he wanted a more narrowly worded amendment but was 'overruled' by
'national experts' he identified as the Alliance Defense Fund ..... See Gregory
Phillips, Passionate Amendment One Debate Goes Beyond Gay Marriage,
FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (May 6, 2012),
http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2012/05/06/1166215.
26. Vote FOR Marriage N.C., Vote FOR Marriage N.C. Launches New TV Ad
Refuting False Claims About Amendment, YouTUBE (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnbFIN8j5fk.
27. See generally Lynn R. Buzzard, William A. Woodruff & E. Gregory Wallace,
The Meaning and Potential Legal Effects of North Carolina's Proposed Marriage
Amendment, (Apr. 18, 2012) (not formally published), available at
http://www.wral.com/asset/news/state/nccapitol/2012/04/24/11019583/ma-
statementl.pdf.
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id For one example of the various issues that could have been debated
publicly, see Holning Lau, Would a Constitutional Amendment Protect and Promote
Marriage in North Carolina? An Analysis of Data from 2000 to 2009, 2012 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 173 (2012).
30. Buzzard et al., supra note 27, at 16.
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expertise, but rarely with counterarguments.3 1
There is nothing wrong with legal academics taking public positions on
controversial issues. That is their First Amendment right, of course, and
public discourse generally is well-served when they do. But law professors
also hold a position of trust with the public because of their legal expertise.
Rightly or wrongly, when they speak as "experts" on the law--clarifying
difficult legal concepts, explaining legal texts, or predicting how courts
might rule-they often are perceived as providing legal analysis that is
largely untainted by partisan views.32 There is a difference, then, between
a law professor saying "Because I believe in equality, I am opposed to the
Amendment," and saying "Because courts will rule this way if the
Amendment passes, I am opposed to the Amendment." While both are
legitimate, the public understands the former conclusion to be determined
by the professor's own moral, political, or social views, while it expects the
latter to be guided by the tools of the legal profession.
The distinction between partisan advocate and legal expert, while never
exact, was blurred by legal academics who opposed the Amendment. As
explained below, conventional legal analysis does not support their
predictions that the Amendment "would" or "could" (a distinction mostly
lost on the public) lead to a parade of horribles for all unmarried couples in
the state. There is very little chance that North Carolina courts will
interpret the Amendment to apply to any relationship between unmarried
persons and invalidate their domestic violence protections, child custody,
adoption, and visitation rights, health benefits, hospital visitation
privileges, emergency medical decision making, and end-of-life decisions.
Instead of conducting a neutral assessment of actual probabilities, however,
the law professors who opposed the Amendment chose the worst-case
31. See, e.g., Buzzardgate, Campbellgate or Tamigate-Uncovering the
Amendment One Truth Behind the Campbell Law Professors' Paper, NC AMENDMENT
ONE TRUTH (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://ncamendmentonetruth.wordpress.com/2012/04/30/buzzardgate-campbellgate-or-
tamigate-uncovering-the-amendment-one-truth-behind-the-campbell-law-professors-
paper; Carlos Maza, Meet the "Legal Experts" Supporting North Carolina's Anti-Gay
Marriage Amendment, EQUAL. MATTERS (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://equalitymatters.org/blog/201204250001; Wake Forest Law Professor Explains
the Proposed Amendment One, BLUENC (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.bluenc.com/wake-forest-law-professor-explains-proposed-amendment-one
(quoting Suzanne Reynolds).
32. Indeed, most law schools promote their faculty as "experts" available for media
interviews when news stories have legal implications. See, e.g., News & Media, U. OF
N.C. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.unc.edu/news/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13,
2013); Faculty Experts, DUKE L., http://law.duke.edulnews/press/facexperts (last
visited Apr. 12, 2013); Need a Media Expert?, U. OF MINN. LAW,
http://www.law.umn.edu/faculty/expertise.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
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scenario to present to the public.
To be sure, law professors often ask their students to consider various
hypothetical outcomes, including worst-case scenarios, to sharpen their
thinking about legal issues and make them more careful in drafting legal
text. But that approach is not well suited for public discourse, where lay
voters are apt to hear only that law professor X said that Y will happen if we
vote for the proposal-especially if Y is the worst-case scenario.
Presenting the worst-case scenario to the public is a form of disguised
advocacy designed to help your side win.
This is not the first time-nor will it be the last-that law professors
have failed to make accurate public predictions about how courts will rule
because of their political motivations.3 3 Public discourse is best served,
however, when law professors respect the distinction between partisan
advocate and legal expert. In this case, proper analysis of the
Amendment's meaning and effects means asking not "What will win the
election?" but "What will courts likely decide?" While the Chicken Littles
still may be watching the sky, I examine that question next.
II. THE MEANING OF NORTH CAROLINA'S MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
The Marriage Amendment to North Carolina's constitution expands the
state's legal protection of opposite-sex marriage. North Carolina statutes
restrict "marriage" to opposite-sex couples.34 The Amendment goes
beyond these statutes to make opposite-sex marriage the only valid or
recognized "domestic legal union" in the state.
There is little disagreement that the Amendment bars not only same-sex
marriages, but also recognition or validation of civil unions and domestic
partnerships that constitute legal substitutes for the marriage relationship.
The more controversial question is whether the Amendment applies to
other domestic relationships. The answer requires defining the key terms
33. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the
Lawsuits Against PPA CA?, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmx?abstractid=2224364. Hyman notes that "law
professors, who devote their careers to second-guessing other people's decisions,
should not be allowed to skate away from their own failures." Id. at 4. He explains
that such high-profile professional misjudgments can be attributed in part to "motivated
reasoning in an echo chamber"-having a strong emotional or ideological stake in the
outcome which is reinforced by others with the same pre-existing partisan
commitments. Id. at 16-20.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2012) ("A valid and sufficient marriage is created by
the consent of a male and female person who may lawfully marry, presently to take
each other as husband and wife. . . ."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 ("Marriages, whether
created by common law, contracted, or performed outside of North Carolina, between
individuals of the same gender are not valid in North Carolina.").
10
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in the Amendment's first sentence: "domestic legal union" and "valid or
recognized." It also requires understanding the reach of the Amendment's
second sentence, which says that the Amendment does not have any effect
on the making and enforcement of private contracts.
The Amendment's supposed "unintended consequences" likely will not
be given effect by North Carolina courts, which apply traditional canons of
interpretation when considering the meaning of state constitutional
provisions. If the meaning is clear from the words used, courts will not
look for a meaning elsewhere. 36  Context matters: "The best way to
ascertain the meaning of a word or sentence in the Constitution is to read it
contextually and to compare it with other words and sentences with which
it stands connected."37 When the meaning is not clear from the words used,
construing those terms requires that "effect must be given to the intent of
the framers," and so courts "should keep in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and proper recourse should be given to the
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied." 38 To reach a correct
construction, "[r]eference may be had to unofficial contemporaneous
discussions and expositions," 39 and courts may "look to the history [and]
general spirit of the times."40 Constitutional provisions must be interpreted
in pari materia-that is, when a provision is ambiguous, its meaning may
be determined in light of other constitutional provisions on the same
subject matter.4 1
35. Perry v. Stancil, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (N.C. 1953) (noting that construction of
the North Carolina constitution is "in the main governed by the same general principles
which control in ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments").
36. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 479 (N.C. 1989).
37. State v. Emery, 31 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1944) (citations omitted).
38. State Bar v. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d 89, 93 (N.C. 1982); see Stephenson v.
Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 389 (N.C. 2002) ("More importance is to be placed upon the
intent and purpose of a provision than upon the actual language used. '[I]n arriving at
the intent, we are not required to accord the language used an unnecessarily literal
meaning. Greater regard is to be given to the dominant purpose than to the use of any
particular words. . . .' (quoting Perry, 75 S.E.2d at 514) (internal citations omitted)).
39. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 93-94. The court in Perry explained that
"[c]onstitutional provisions should be construed in consonance with the objects and
purposes in contemplation at the time of adoption. To ascertain the intent of those by
whom the language was used, we must consider the conditions as they then existed and
the purpose sought to be accomplished ... . The court should place itself as nearby as
possible in the position of the men who framed the instrument." 75 S.E.2d at 514.
40. DuMont, 286 S.E.2d at 94 (quoting Perry, 75 S.E.2d at 514).
41. Baxter v. Danny Nicholson, Inc., 690 S.E.2d 265, 267 (N.C. 2010).
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A. The First Sentence: "Domestic Legal Union" and "Valid or
Recognized"
The first sentence of the Amendment states that "[m]arriage between one
man and one woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid or
recognized in this State."42 While the term "domestic legal union" never
has been used in North Carolina law, it seems reasonable to conclude that
in the Amendment's immediate and broader legal context, a "domestic
legal union" is a marriage or equivalent legal status. The term is shorthand
for marriage and civil unions or domestic partnerships that are legal
substitutes for marriage. It does not include relationships that do not
constitute or closely resemble marriage.
The term "domestic legal union" contains two modifiers, "domestic" and
"legal," that limit the type of union affected by the Amendment.
"Domestic" refers to that which relates "to the family or household.'A3 Its
usage ensures the Amendment cannot be construed to refer to some other
kind of union, such as labor unions or credit unions. "Legal" means "that
which is according to law .... It does not mean permitted by law, but
means created by law."" It refers to a "formal status derived from law,"05
something "[e]stablished or recognized by law.""6 Its usage confines the
reach of the Amendment to unions that derive their existence, recognition,
or status from the law. This includes a legal status created or recognized by
legislation, executive action, court decision, or other operation of law.
The key limiting term is the noun "union." North Carolina courts
frequently have used the term "union" to describe the marital relationship. 7
42. N.C. CONsT. art. XIV, § 6.
43. Domestic Definition, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE (5th
ed. 2011), http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=domestic&submit.x=53
&submit.y=10 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
44. West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 610 (N.C. 1985) (quoting Nat'l Council Junior
Order Am. Mechs. v. Tate, 193 S.E. 397, 399 (N.C. 1937)) (internal quotations
omitted).
45. Legal Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/legal (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
46. Legal Definition, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE,
http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=legal&submit.x=0&submit.y=0 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013).
47. While the phrases "legal union" or "domestic union" have not been used in
North Carolina law, North Carolina court decisions contain numerous references to
"marriage union" or "marital union." See, e.g., State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 336-
37 (N.C. 2009) (noting that the marital communications privilege "is a product of the
continually evolving common law marital privileges that historically sought to promote
credibility and protect the intimacy of the marital union" and "is premised upon the
12
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This is a common usage. Black's Law Dictionary defines "marriage" as
"[t]he legal union of a couple as spouses."48 It also defines "same-sex
marriage" as "[t]he ceremonial union of two people of the same sex; a
marriage or marriage-like relationship between two women or two men."49
More important than generic dictionary definitions is the context in
which the term "union" is used. Because North Carolina has limited
marriage to opposite-sex couples by statute5 0 "union" has not been used in
state law to describe same-sex marriage or its alternatives. The term
"union" has been used, however, to refer to civil unions and domestic
partnerships in states like California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont, where state legislatures have
created such marriage alternatives.5 ' Civil unions generally are understood
belief that the marital union is sacred and that its intimacy and confidences deserves
legal protection") (emphasis added); Woodard v. Blue, 9 S.E. 492, 494 (N.C. 1889)
(referring to the "offspring of a lawful union") (emphasis added); Kornegay v.
Robinson, 625 S.E.2d 805, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (referring to "prior marriages and
offspring from those unions") (emphasis added), rev'd, 637 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. 2006);
Anderson v. Lackey, 593 S.E.2d 87, 88 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("Plaintiff and defendant
were married on or about 6 July 1985. Colby was born of the union on 19 March
1988.") (emphasis added); Jeffries v. Moore, 559 S.E.2d 217, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(addressing "the presumption of legitimacy which attaches when a child is born during
a marriage union") (emphasis added); Harris v. Harris, 373 S.E.2d 312, 313 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (noting that "the plaintiff and defendant entered a union of marriage")
(emphasis added); Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 798 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(declaring that "a marriage is a union of individuals") (emphasis added); Jackson v.
Jackson, 315 S.E.2d 90, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("marriage union"); Heist v. Heist,
265 N.E.2d 434, 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) ("marital union").
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (9th ed. 2009).
49. Id. at 1061.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 6, 51-1, 51-1.2 (2012).
51. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.2 (West 2012) ("A legal union of two persons of
the same sex, other than a marriage, that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and
that is substantially equivalent to a domestic partnership as defined in this part, shall be
recognized as a valid domestic partnership in this state regardless of whether it bears
the name domestic partnership."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (2012) ("'Civil union'
means a legal union between 2 individuals of the same sex established pursuant to this
chapter."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-B-9 (2012) ("Partners to a civil union lawfully
entered into . . . shall have all the same rights, benefits, protections, and responsibilities
under law .. . as are granted to those who [marry]."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/10
(2012) ("'Civil union' means a legal relationship between two persons, of either the
same or opposite sex, established pursuant to this Act."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.500
(2012) ("A legal union of two persons, other than a marriage as recognized by the
Nevada Constitution, that was validly formed in another jurisdiction, and that is
substantially equivalent to a domestic partnership as defined in this chapter, must be
recognized as a valid domestic partnership in this State regardless of whether the union
bears the name of a domestic partnership."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29(a) (West 2012)
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to be a legal status nearly identical to marriage, but between same-sex
couples. 52 Domestic partnerships also may constitute a legal status similar
to marriage, such as in California.5 3
The Amendment does not forbid the legal recognition or validity of all
domestic relationships, but only of domestic "unions." The term "union"
limits the Amendment's reach only to marriage and other legal statuses,
such as civil unions or domestic partnerships, that substitute for the marital
union. The Amendment could have prohibited only same-sex marriage by
stating that "[m]arriage between one man and one woman is the only
marriage that shall be valid or recognized in this State." Instead,
Amendment drafters used the broader term-"domestic legal union"-to
ensure that neither the legislature nor the judiciary in North Carolina will
("'Civil union' means the legally recognized union of two eligible individuals of the
same sex established pursuant to this act. Parties to a civil union shall receive the same
benefits and protections and be subject to the same responsibilities as spouses in a
marriage."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3.1-1(2) (2012) ("'Civil union' means a legal union
between two individuals of the same sex. . . ."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b)
(2012) ("A party to a civil union shall be included in any definition or use of the terms
'spouse,' 'family,' 'immediate family,' 'dependent,' 'next of kin,' and other terms that
denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the law."); Knight
v. Super. Ct., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005) (referring to officially-recognized
domestic partnerships as "unions" or "legal unions" eleven times); see also Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006) ("The name to be given to the statutory scheme
that provides full rights and benefits to same-sex couples, whether marriage or some
other term, is a matter left to the democratic process."); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
867 (Vt. 1999) ("We hold that the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-
sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under
Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage
laws themselves or a parallel 'domestic partnership' system or some equivalent
statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature."). Vermont approved same-sex
marriage in 2009, so civil unions are no longer available as of September 1, 2009;
however, civil unions entered prior to that date remain valid. Same-sex marriage
became legal in Delaware in July 2013. While civil unions are no longer available in
Delaware, all existing civil unions will be converted into marriages by July 2014.
52. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31(a) (West 2012) ("Civil union couples shall
have all of the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law . ., as are
granted to spouses in a marriage."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(b) (2012) ("Parties
to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under
law. . . as are granted to spouses in a civil marriage."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 75/20
(2012) ("A party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal obligations,
responsibilities, protections, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of
Illinois to spouses . . .").
53. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2007) ("Registered domestic partners shall
have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law ... as are granted to and imposed
upon spouses.").
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follow other states in creating same-sex marriage or legal statuses that
serve as marriage alternatives for same-sex couples. Because the
Amendment forbids only domestic unions, it does not apply to domestic
relationships between unmarried couples who are merely living together,
dating, or roommates, nor does it apply to other domestic relationships such
as parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, or sibling. This is true not only as
a matter of constitutional interpretation, but also by the term's common
sense meaning-nobody refers to a couple who is dating as being in a
"legal union." 54
The main flaw in the Eichner Paper is that the authors do not give the
term "union" its proper effect in limiting the Amendment's reach. Rather,
they contend that "the Amendment would restrict protections for all
unmarried couples."s In their view, the language of the Amendment is
"significantly broader" than other state marriage amendments and thus
"could be interpreted broadly, to bar all relationship rights for unmarried
couples."5 They claim that while other state marriage amendments limit
marriage to opposite-sex couples and prohibit creation of legal statuses for
same-sex couples substantially equivalent to marriage, "North Carolina's
language goes beyond this, barring the 'validity' or 'recognition' of
relationships of unmarried couples, even for purposes of giving these
relationships much less significant protections than those accorded married
couples."5 To apply the Amendment this broadly, however, courts would
have to read the term "union" to encompass all domestic relationships,
which is inconsistent with both its legal and common usage.
54. See, e.g., Ferreira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 37 A.3d 104 (R.I. 2011) (rejecting
extension of insurance benefits to persons engaged to be married or simply living
together because such relationships do not constitute civil unions, domestic
partnerships, and other similar unions and partnerships validly recognized and entered
into under state law).
55. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 1 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 2. We examine below the language of several state marriage amendments
and show that this assertion is false.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Diane Juffras makes a similar error when she says that under the Amendment
"marriage is the only legal status that the state can grant an opposite-sex couple" and
"the state cannot grant any legal status whatsoever to relationships between same-sex
couples." See Diane M. Juffras, Amendment One, North Carolina Public Employers,
and Domestic Partner Benefits, 39 PuB. EMP. BULL. 1, 2-3 (June 2012), available at
http://sogpubs.unc.edulelectronicversions/pdfs/pelb39.pdf. She goes on to define
"domestic legal union" as "a relationship between two people who are living together
that is authorized by the state, has been entered into in accordance with procedures set
forth by law, and gives the parties certain rights and responsibilities." Id. at 6. While
this definition is much narrower than the Eichner Paper's "all unmarried couples," it
does not necessarily mean a marital or marital-like relationship, as indicated by the
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A legal "union" is a status created by law, as distinguished from mere
conduct. That is why the Amendment will not affect North Carolina's
statute that terminates post-separation support or alimony when a
dependent spouse engages in cohabitation, which is defined as "the act of
two adults dwelling together continuously and habitually in a private
heterosexual relationship, even if this relationship is not solemnized by
marriage, or a private homosexual relationship."59  Cohabitation here
describes an "act" (i.e., conduct) and not a legal status created for the
purpose of conferring certain rights, privileges, or benefits.
The Amendment also uses the term "valid or recognized" in the first
sentence: "Marriage between one man and one woman is the only domestic
legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this State."60 Black's Law
Dictionary defines "valid" as "legally sufficient; binding;",6 the American
Heritage Dictionary defines "valid" as meaning "having legal force,
effective or binding;, 62 and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the
term as "having legal efficacy or force."63 Black's Law Dictionary defines
the term "recognize" in its noun form, "recognition," as "[t]he formal
admission that a person, entity, or thing has a particular status,"" while the
Merriam- Webster Dictionary defines the term in its verb form,
"recognize," as "to acknowledge formally: as to admit of being a particular
status."65 The Amendment thus prohibits legislative, executive, or judicial
action that legalizes or gives official sanction, approval, or significance to a
domestic legal union, as well as action that merely acknowledges the legal
existence of such union.
The meaning of the first sentence in the North Carolina Marriage
Amendment becomes even clearer when it is compared to language in
marriage amendments in other states. Ten state amendments define
marriage as between only a man and woman, while one state amendment
legal and common usage of the term "union."
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (2012).
60. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
61. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 1690.
62. Valid Definition, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE,
http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=valid&submit.x=68&submit.y=21
(last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
63. Valid Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/valid?show-0&t-1364738808 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013).
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 1385.
65. Recognize Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recognize?show-0&t-1364771510 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2013).
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gives the state legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples. 6 Seventeen state amendments not only limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples, but also bar the state from creating or recognizing
other marriage-like relationships-such as certain civil unions or domestic
partnerships-which have the same or similar legal status, rights, or effects
as marriage.6 7 Two state amendments include these broader provisions but
further forbid the state from recognizing any private contractual agreements
conferring or assigning the rights, benefits, obligations, or effects of
marriage.
The first sentence of the North Carolina Marriage Amendment is
virtually identical to the Idaho amendment, which was adopted in 2006.69
The Idaho legislature's joint resolution on the amendment contains a
section describing the "Effect of Adoption" of the amendment, which
66. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (Alaska); ARIz. CONST. art. XXX, § 1 (Arizona);
CAL. CONST. art. I, 7.5 (2012) (California); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 (Colorado);
Miss. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A (Mississippi); Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 33 (Missouri);
MONT. CONsT. art. XIII, § 7 (Montana); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 (Nevada); OR. CONST.
art. XV, § 5A (Oregon); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (Tennessee). California's
provision was declared unconstitutional in federal district court. See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (subsequent history omitted).
The Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2562 (2013), held that the
provision's proponents did not have standing to appeal the district court's order and
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision affirming the district court. The district court's
decision still stands, but its scope currently is disputed. Hawaii's constitutional
amendment grants the state legislature the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex
couples. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
67. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03(g) (Alabama); ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 1
(Arkansas); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (Florida); GA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (Georgia); IDAHO
CONsT. art. III, § 28 (Idaho); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (Kansas); Ky. CONST. § 233A
(Kentucky); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (Louisiana); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (Nebraska);
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (North Dakota); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (Ohio); OKLA.
CONsT. art. II, § 35 (Oklahoma); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (South Carolina); S.D.
CONST. art. XXI, § 9 (South Dakota); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (Texas); UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 29 (Utah); Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 13 (Wisconsin).
68. Michigan's amendment states that "the union of one man and one woman in
marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (emphasis added). Virginia's amendment provides
that "only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this Commonwealth" and forbids creation or recognition of "a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance, or effects of marriage." VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A. It
additionally prohibits creation or recognition of "another union, partnership, or other
legal status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of
marriage." Id. (emphasis added).
69. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 ("Marriage between a man and a woman is the only
domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this State.").
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reads:
It is intended to prohibit recognition by the State of Idaho, or any of its
political subdivisions, of civil unions, domestic partnerships, or any other
relationship that attempts to approximate marriage, no matter how
denominated. The language is further intended to prohibit the State of
Idaho, or any of its political subdivisions, from granting any or all of the
legal benefits of marriage to civil unions, domestic partnerships, or any
other relationship that attempts to approximate marriage.70
This legislative explanation plainly supports interpreting North
Carolina's Marriage Amendment to apply only to marriages and marriage
imitations or substitutes, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships,
and not to reach beyond to other types of domestic relationships between
unmarried persons that do not attempt to approximate marriage.
The Idaho amendment is significant because the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Redmond v. Town of Tarboro7 construed a North Carolina
constitutional provision that was taken verbatim from another state's
constitution. The court relied on a leading case from that state to construe
the North Carolina provision, noting that "[t]he construction put upon it
therefore, by the supreme court of that state, is entitled to great weight." 72
The court explained:
Where the terms of a statute which has received judicial construction are
used in a later statute, whether passed by the legislature of the same state
or country or by that of another, that construction is to be given to the
latter statute. It is presumed that the legislature which passed the latter
statute knew the judicial construction which had been placed on the
former one, and such construction becomes a part of the law. The
foregoing rule, while not absolutely binding, is used as a valuable aid in
the construction of laws.7
The same logic applies to the Idaho legislature's explanation of its
marriage amendment, about which the North Carolina legislature
presumably would have known. While the construction was given by
Idaho's legislature rather than by its highest court, North Carolina courts
likely will give that construction great weight in expounding the meaning
of the North Carolina Marriage Amendment.
Amendment opponents repeatedly stress that the phrase "domestic legal
union" has not been used in North Carolina law or elsewhere (except, of
70. See Ben Ysursa, 2006 General Election Proposed Constitutional Amendments,
IDAHO SEC'Y OF ST., http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/06_hjr2_stmnteffect.htm
(last visited June 30, 2013).
71. 10 S.E. 845 (N.C. 1890).
72. Id. at 849.
73. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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course in Idaho's amendment). They ignore the fact, however, that the
term "union," along with the terms "domestic" and "legal," frequently are
used in other state marriage amendments in ways that clearly limit those
amendments to marriage and legal substitutes for marriage, such as civil
unions or domestic partnerships. Here are some examples:
The North Dakota Constitution states that "[m]arriage consists only of
the legal union between a man and a woman. No other domestic union,
however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the
same or substantially equivalent legal effect."74
The South Carolina Constitution states that "[a] marriage between one
man and one woman is the only lawful domestic union that shall be valid
or recognized in this State. This State and its political subdivisions shall
not create a legal status, right or claim respecting any other domestic
union, however denominated."75
The Florida Constitution states that "[i]nasmuch as marriage is the legal
union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife, no other
legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent
thereof shall be valid or recognized."76
The Utah Constitution states "[m]arriage consists only of the legal union
between a man and a woman. No other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or
substantially equivalent legal effect."77
The Arkansas Constitution states that "[m]arriage consists only of the
union between one man and one woman. Legal status for unmarried
persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall
not be valid or recognized in Arkansas . . . .78
The Ohio Constitution states that "[o]nly a union between one man and
one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its
political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance
or effect of marriage."79
The Texas Constitution states that "[m]arriage in this state shall consist
only of the union of one man and one woman. This state or a political
subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status
identical or similar to marriage."80
74. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (emphasis added).
75. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (emphasis added).
76. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (emphasis added).
77. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (emphasis added).
78. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 2 (emphasis added).
79. OHIo CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added).
80. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (emphasis added).
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The Louisiana Constitution states that "[n]o official or court of the state
of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state law to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any
member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman. A
legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized."'
The Nebraska Constitution states that "[o]nly marriage between a man
and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of
two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in
Nebraska." 82
The South Dakota Constitution states that "[o]nly marriage between a
man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in South Dakota. The
uniting of two or more persons in a civil union, domestic partnership, or
other quasi-marital relationship shall not be valid or recognized."83
The Kentucky Constitution states that "[o]nly a marriage between one
man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in
Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized." 84
Although each amendment is stated somewhat differently, the effect of
all is two-fold: (1) to limit the status, rights, benefits, and protections
associated with marriage to marriages between one man and one woman,
and (2) to prohibit legal recognition or validation of other types of marital-
like unions or legal statuses. None of these amendments bar creation or
recognition of legal rights, benefits, or protections for unmarried couples
who do not have such marital-like relationships. While the aim of the
North Carolina Marriage Amendment could have been stated with greater
clarity, it accomplishes these same two effects by specifying that
"[m]arriage between one man and one woman is the only domestic legal
union that shall be valid or recognized in this State."86 There is no reason
to think that North Carolina courts will give the Amendment a uniquely
broader meaning than marriage amendments in other states by applying it
to all relationships between unmarried couples.
The more difficult question is whether the North Carolina Marriage
81. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (emphasis added).
82. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (emphasis added).
83. S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9 (emphasis added).
84. KY. CONST. § 233A (emphasis added).
85. For a more nuanced view of the various state marriage amendments, see
generally Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive
Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U.L. REv.
221 (2005).
86. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
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Amendment operates as a blanket prohibition on legal benefits for same-
sex couples. As explained above, the term "domestic legal union"
describes a marital-like legal status. The Amendment is silent, however,
about the degree of similarity to marriage required to constitute such a
union. Many state marriage amendments specify the degree to which
prohibited marital-like statuses must resemble marriage by using terms
such as "similar," "substantially similar," "substantially equivalent," and
"intends to approximate."87 Contrary to what Amendment opponents
predicted, this ambiguity in the North Carolina Marriage Amendment is
more likely to be exploited to restrict the Amendment's scope than to
expand it.
There are at least three points of comparison between marriages and
marriage substitutes: (1) eligibility and formation requirements; (2) rights,
benefits, and obligations conferred (which typically are described as the
"incidents" of marriage); and (3) termination requirements. In determining
whether a legal status for same-sex partners is substantially similar to or
approximates marriage, several questions arise: must substantial similarity
exist across-the-board at all three points of comparison, or is it enough to
have substantial similarity on any one point? Is determining substantial
similarity simply a matter of totaling similarities and differences, or are
some similarities or differences more relevant or important than others?
May the state grant a single right or benefit to a partner in a same-sex
relationship when that requires treating the partner as if he or she is a
spouse?
The controversy over Wisconsin's creation of domestic partnerships
87. See, e.g., ARK CONST. amend. LXXXIII, § 2 ("Marriage consists only of the
union between one man and one woman. Legal status for unmarried persons which is
identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in
Arkansas. . . .") (emphasis added); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (2008) ("Inasmuch as
marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife, no
other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall
be valid or recognized.") (emphasis added); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("The uniting of
two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar
same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.") (emphasis added);
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (2004) ("Marriage consists only of the legal union between a
man and a woman. No other domestic union, however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.")
(emphasis added); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (2004) ("This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.") (emphasis added); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (2005) ("Marriage consists
only of the legal union between a man and a woman. No other domestic union,
however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or
substantially equivalent legal effect.") (emphasis added).
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provides a good starting point in answering these questions. Wisconsin's
marriage amendment, adopted in 2006, states that "[o]nly a marriage
between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in this state. A legal status identical or substantially similar to
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized
in this state."8 In 2009, the Wisconsin legislature passed a domestic
partnership law creating the "legal status" of "domestic partnership" and
granting such partners some of the same rights and obligations accorded
marriage. 8 9 The law was challenged on the ground that it creates a "legal
status" that is "substantially similar to marriage."
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals took an essentially "all or nothing"
approach in Appling v. Doyle90 and held that the legal status of a domestic
partnership in Wisconsin is not substantially similar to the legal status of
marriage because the state did not confer all or almost all of the legal
benefits and obligations of marriage that it could confer. 91 The court
rejected the argument that the relevant point of comparison is the eligibility
and formation requirements for a marriage, rather than the rights and
obligations incident to a marriage. 92 While it found many similarities in the
eligibility and formation criteria (e.g., number of persons, gender,
competency, age, consanguinity, etc.), it noted two significant differences:
domestic partners must reside together as a prerequisite to recognition of
their legal status, and no formal or ceremonial commitment is required.93
When comparing the rights and obligations of the two statuses, the Court
observed that "it would 'take pages' to list the rights and obligations that go
with marriage but not domestic partnerships," and noted that the trial court
had identified thirty-three specific differences.94 The court of appeals also
found substantial differences in the termination requirements, with a
domestic partnership being terminated upon either party filing a notice of
termination with the county clerk, giving notice to the other party, and
paying a fee. 95 The court finally explained that even if it ignored the two
differences in the eligibility and formation criteria identified above, it still
would conclude that marriages and domestic partnerships in Wisconsin are
88. WiS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
89. WIs. STAT. § 770.05 (West 2012).
90. 826 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 2012).
91. Id at 685.
92. Id at 671-74.
93. Id. at 682-84.
94. Id at 684.
95. Id
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not substantially similar.96
The Appling court determined that a legal status prohibited under the
state's marriage amendment must be substantially similar to marriage in all
three points of comparison--eligibility and formation, benefits and
obligations, and termination. Marriage-like requirements found solely in
the criteria used to identify eligible couples and formalize their
relationships, the court reasoned, are not sufficient to make domestic
partnership a legal status substantially similar to marriage in Wisconsin
because there is no substantial similarity in the benefits and obligations
granted. The court nevertheless hypothesized that a legal status
substantially similar to marriage could be created by similarity solely in
benefits and obligations:
[I]t is unreasonable to think that "legal status" excludes reference to the
rights and obligations of marriage because that would mean that voters
thought the marriage amendment would permit legally recognized same-
sex-couple relationships that are formed with criteria different than
marriage criteria but carry with them all the rights and obligations that
attend marriage-in other words, marriage by any other name.
This inconsistency potentially undermines the court's essentially "all or
nothing" approach. If a Wisconsin voter would think the state's marriage
amendment bars substantial similarity in benefits and obligations even
though there is no such similarity in eligibility and formation criteria, then
why would a Wisconsin voter not also think the amendment applies when a
domestic partner must meet marriage-like eligibility criteria to qualify for a
single right or benefit that traditionally is reserved for married couples?
For example, if Wisconsin extends spousal health insurance benefits to
domestic partners conditioned upon being in a spousal-like relationship
with the employee, as defined by eligibility criteria substantially similar to
marriage, it would seem that the state has created a legal status
substantially similar to marriage for the purpose of conferring that benefit.
Two considerations may help resolve this inconsistency, while at the
same time limiting the relevance of Appling. First, Appling addressed the
constitutionality of a state statute creating a comprehensive, stand-alone
legal status of "domestic partnership," not a legal status conveying a
96. Id. at 685.
97. Id. at 672. The parties challenging the domestic partnership law in Appling
apparently took the position that Wisconsin could "accord[] all of marriage's legal
incidents to every Wisconsin citizen" without violating the state's marriage
amendment, so long as the criteria for obtaining such benefits are not substantially
similar to the eligibility and formation requirements for marriage. Id. at 672-73
(internal quotations omitted).
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specific legal right or benefit of marriage in a particular context, such as
spousal health insurance benefits. While the court in dicta suggests that
Wisconsin can create a legal status extending such benefits without
98violating its marriage amendment, that was not the issue in the case.
Second, and more importantly, in public statements prior to the vote,
proponents of Wisconsin's marriage amendment repeatedly asserted that
the purpose of the amendment was to prohibit only "Vermont-style" civil
unions which simply are marriages by another name because they confer on
same-sex couples essentially all the rights, benefits, and obligations of
marriage. They acknowledged that civil unions or domestic partnerships
that conferred a more limited subset of the rights and obligations of
marriage would be permissible under the amendment. 99 Given such
statements, it is not surprising that the Appling court limited the reach of
Wisconsin's marriage amendment.
The Michigan Supreme Court took a different approach in National
Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan,10 0 which held
unconstitutional certain public employee health insurance plans that offered
benefits to the employees' domestic partners. The Michigan amendment
declares that "the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be
the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose."101  Benefit plan supporters argued that because the public
employers did not bestow on domestic partnerships all the legal rights and
responsibilities of marriage, the partnerships recognized under the plans
were not "similar" to marriage. The court explained, however, that "[a]
union does not have to possess all the same legal rights and responsibilities
that result from a marriage in order to constitute a union "similar" to that of
98. Id. at 677.
99. Id at 676-80. For example, Representative Gundrum, one of the sponsors of
the marriage amendment legislation, was quoted as saying that the amendment "would
allow the Legislature at some point to create a civil union that includes a limited
number of benefits, as long as it wasn't 'substantially similar' to what's granted to a
married couple." Id. at 677-78 (quoting Rep. Gundrum) (internal quotations omitted).
Senator Fitzgerald, another co-sponsor, explained in a press release that "the proposed
amendment does not ban civil unions, only a Vermont-style system that is simply a
marriage by another name ... . [T]he legislature will still be free to pass legislation
creating civil unions if it so desires." Id. at 678 (quoting Sen. Fitzgerald) (internal
quotations omitted). Proponent Richard Esenberg stated in a debate on the amendment
voters should "[t]hink of marriage as a bundle of sticks. Each stick is a different right
or incident of marriage. The second sentence [of the amendment] only prohibits
creation of a legal status which would convey virtually all of those sticks." Id. at 789,
826 N.W.2d at 679 (quoting Richard Esenberg) (internal quotations omitted).
100. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
101. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (2004).
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marriage" because that would render the term "or similar union"
meaningless.' 02  The court then seized upon two unique eligibility
requirements for marriage, rather than the sum total of the legal effects of
marriage, to find sufficient similarity-"[a]lthough there are ... many
different types of relationships in Michigan that are accorded legal
significance ... marriages and domestic partnerships appear to be the only
such relationships that are defined in terms of both gender and the lack of a
close blood connection."103
While a marital-like relationship is implicit in the North Carolina
Marriage Amendment's use of the term "domestic legal union," North
Carolina courts will likely not follow Appling's "all or nothing approach"
by similarly limiting the Amendment's scope. The Amendment's language
and history do not contain any limits that restrict its scope only to those
domestic legal unions that possess all or essentially all of the incidents of
marriage. The Amendment expressly bans creation or recognition of "all"
unions other than heterosexual marriage, which has similar effect to the
"for any purpose" language of the Michigan amendment. This wider effect
is clearly seen in the Idaho legislature's explanation of the effect of nearly
identical language in Idaho's marriage amendment.104 Such language is
intended to prohibit not only the recognition of "civil unions, domestic
partnerships, or any other relationship that attempts to approximate
marriage, no matter how denominated" but also the granting of "any or all
of the legal benefits of marriage to civil unions, domestic partnerships, or
any other relationship that attempts to approximate marriage."'o Thus, a
102. National Pride at Work, Inc., 748 N.W.2d at 534.
103. Id. at 535-36 (original emphasis). The National Pride at Work decision is
discussed more fully below in Part III.B, which addresses the effect of North Carolina's
Marriage Amendment on employee benefits. In a similar opinion on employee health
insurance coverage for domestic partners, the Kentucky Attorney General explained:
"Recognition" of a "substantially similar legal status" to marriage . . . need not
imply recognizing any substantial proportion of rights and obligations
conferred upon married persons under existing law. If the standard were of
that nature, it would have to be subject to continual reappraisal whenever
statutes affecting the rights of married persons were amended, enacted, or
repealed. Moreover, and more importantly, allowing a limited recognition of a
similarly-defined relationship to marriage for some purposes, provided only
that it were not extended to all subject matters at the same time, would enable
various state agencies within their separate spheres of competence to
accomplish piecemeal by the sum of their efforts what the legislature could
not.
Ky. Op. Att'y Gen., No. OAG 07-004, 2007 WL 1652597, at *3-4 (June 1, 2007).
104. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 ("Marriage between a man and a woman is the only
domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this State.").
105. See Ysursa, supra note 70 (emphasis added).
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legal status similar to marriage can be created by the granting of a single
benefit, if the eligibility requirements for that benefit are similar to
marriage. So long as the same-sex couple (or unmarried heterosexual
couple) is required to satisfy marriage-like criteria to receive the legal right
or benefit, and so long as the right or benefit is one that typically is
reserved for married persons, the state has created a legal status that
recognizes or validates a "domestic legal union" other than heterosexual
marriage.
This interpretation is consistent with the scope of the North Carolina
Marriage Amendment as described by its supporters. While the
Amendment prohibits marriages by another name, such as Vermont-style
civil unions or California-style domestic partnerships, no similar history in
North Carolina limits the Amendment's scope to only such broadly-
defined, all-encompassing unions. Amendment supporters acknowledged
that it applies to extending a specific spousal right or benefit to a same-sex
couple if the right or benefit is conditioned upon marriage-like eligibility
requirements. For example, Representative Paul Stam, one of the
Amendment's leading legislative supporters, explained in a press release
that:
[a]ny benefits extended by government to a person based on a domestic
legal union other than marriage would be prohibited. But Government
could still extend employment benefits that impact or benefit non-
married domestic households. The extension of such benefits, however,
could not be predicated only upon the status of a domestic relationship
other than marriage. For example, a city could still allow an employee to
pick one other person of his or her choice to be the beneficiary for health
insurance.10 6
Prior to the vote, Representative Stain also introduced into the legislative
record a memorandum from the Alliance Defense Fund (now Alliance
Defending Freedom), which discussed the Amendment's application to
specific benefits:
The proposed amendment does not proscribe the dissemination of any
form of benefit or privilege, even if such benefits support the same-sex
partner of a governmental employee. The proposed amendment is, by its
own language, unconcerned with benefits. What the proposed
amendment does is limit to only marriage the types of domestic legal
unions that may form the basis for the dissemination of benefits.
For example, under the proposed amendment, the State of North
Carolina could allow its employees to designate any one additional
person as a beneficiary of any retirement benefits they might receive, or
as a beneficiary of their health care coverage. The fact that the same-sex
106. Press Release, Paul Stam, supra note 25.
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partner of a state employee might be designated as that beneficiary
would be completely permissible under such a scheme since the
dissemination of benefits is not premised on any domestic legal union,
but only the employee's designation of the beneficiary.o 7
Amendment supporters thus recognized that the Amendment bars the
extension of specific marriage-like rights or benefits to same-sex partners if
they are treated as spouses in order to obtain the rights or benefits, but it
does not bar such rights or benefits if granted pursuant to non-marriage-like
criteria.
To illustrate the meaning of the Amendment's first sentence, suppose
that the North Carolina legislature passes a law that gives a "domestic
partner" the same rights as a surviving spouse in the disposition of a
deceased person's remains. The law defines domestic partner as "a person
who was in a committed relationship with the deceased person," and lists
several factors that define when such a relationship exists. The right of the
domestic partner is given priority over the protests of all members of the
decedent's family, including the decedent's children, parents, and siblings.
Would this law be valid under the Amendment? Probably not. The right
to dispose of a decedent's remains traditionally has been reserved to the
surviving spouse and, if none, the next of kin. 08 The right of the domestic
partner under this law would be given the same legal effect as that of the
surviving spouse, and thus would recognize and validate the domestic
partnership as a legal union-a marriage-like status that treats the partner
like a surviving spouse. On the other hand, if the law only adds a domestic
partner to the list of persons who may control the disposition of the
decedent's remains but does not give the partner the same or similar rights
as a surviving spouse, the law likely will not be barred by the Amendment.
That is because the domestic partner is being treated like other persons
whose rights under the law are not dependent upon having a marital or
marital-like union with the deceased.
Current North Carolina law allows control over the disposition of a
deceased person's remains by "a person who has exhibited special care and
concern for the decedent and is willing and able to make decisions about
the disposition."' 09 That person is placed in order of priority behind the
deceased's surviving spouse, children, parents, siblings, and certain other
relatives. Empowering a domestic partner in this category based simply on
recognition of the partner's relationship to the deceased will not violate the
107. Memorandum from Alliance Defense Fund to N.C. House Majority Leader
Paul Stam, supra note 25, at 8.
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-420 (2010).
109. § 130A-420(b)(6).
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Amendment. The disposition of remains is not an exclusively spousal
right-other persons also may direct the disposition in order of priority
under the law. Like those persons, the domestic partner's empowerment
does not depend upon the partner having a marital or marital-like union
with the deceased, but rather on the partner's display of "special care and
concern" for the deceased, which is a category that may include cohabiting
partners of the same or opposite sex, friends, co-workers, and others who
are not married or related to the deceased. The Amendment will not keep a
domestic partner from qualifying under this category because the
Amendment bars legal recognition or validation of domestic unions, not
relationships of special care and concern.110
The first sentence of the North Carolina Marriage Amendment bars the
state from validating or recognizing same-sex marriage or its legal
substitutes, including civil unions and domestic partnerships meant to
embody marriage-like relationships. The state cannot create or
acknowledge a legal status that closely approximates or resembles a
marriage by treating an unmarried couple like they are spouses. The term
"domestic legal union" does not include any other domestic relationship
that receives legal recognition, rights, privileges, benefits, or protection
from the state. The Amendment therefore does not alter or affect the legal
status of unmarried persons who are cohabiting, roommates, dating, or just
friends, nor can it be applied to parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, and
sibling relationships. It also will permit the state to extend a variety of
legal benefits and protections to unmarried couples so long as, in doing so,
it does not treat them like they are spouses.
B. The Second Sentence: Contracts Between Private Parties
The second sentence clarifies that the North Carolina Marriage
Amendment does not have any effect on contracts between private parties:
"This section does not prohibit a private party from entering into contracts
with another private party; nor does this section prohibit courts from
adjudicating the rights of private parties pursuant to such contracts.""
This means that the Amendment does not bar continuing judicial
enforcement of agreements between cohabiting, unmarried couples. It also
is a straightforward affirmation that private employers may contract or
otherwise extend benefits to same-sex couples based on their own internal
policies.
110. Our hypothetical illustration about a decedent's remains is based on a question
posed to the Nebraska Attorney General. See Compatibility of Legislation to Vest
Rights in Domestic Partners and Neb. Const. Art. I, § 29, Neb. Op. Att'y Gen., No.
03004, 2003 WL 21207498, at *1 (Mar. 10, 2003).
111. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
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North Carolina courts have enforced contracts between cohabiting,
unmarried couples regarding finances and property, so long as sexual
services or promises thereof did not provide consideration for them.1 2 The
Amendment does not change the law regarding such contracts:
As a result of the second sentence, Amendment One does not prohibit
two same-sex individuals or two opposite-sex unmarried individuals
from entering into legally binding agreements with one another with
respect to joint financial obligations, joint ownership of property, and
disposition of such property under specified circumstances. The
amendment further allows courts to continue to decide cases based on
such agreements.113
The Amendment does not affect private individuals and their private
contractual matters. Marriage contracts, however, are not purely private
contracts, as they involve both the individuals who marry and the state.' 14
While the second sentence does not mention private employment
contracts, its application to such contracts is obvious. As explained in Part
II, the Amendment may bar state and local government employers from
providing domestic partner benefits, but public employers still may offer
such benefits under a different name. The second sentence makes it clear
that any such prohibitions apply to government employers only. Contracts
between private employers and their employees are exempted by the
Amendment's second sentence. If a North Carolina company wants to
grant benefits to same-sex partners, the Amendment does not prohibit that
company's ability to do so.
The Amendment also protects private businesses from being forced by
the government to grant benefits to same-sex couples that opposite-sex
married couples enjoy under company policies, since that would constitute
creation or recognition of a "domestic legal union" other than opposite-sex
marriage. Thus, the Amendment protects businesses in two ways: (1) by
protecting their freedom to offer benefits to domestic partners if they so
decide, and (2) by protecting their freedom not to provide benefits to non-
112. See, e.g., Rhue v. Rhue, 658 S.E.2d 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Suggs v. Norris,
364 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984), aff'd, 321 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. 1984).
113. Juffras, supra note 58. Given the second sentence of the Amendment, it is
astonishing that Professor Gilreath would claim in his op-ed piece that "Amendment
One. . . limits [unmarried couples'] ability to contract around marriage" by making it
unlikely that they could execute and enforce agreements "about how their assets will be
divided should their relationship end." See Gilreath, supra note 15.
114. See, e.g., Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945) ("There are three parties
to a marriage contract-the husband, the wife and the State. For this reason marriage is
denominated as a status, and certain incidents are attached thereto by law which may
not be abrogated without the consent of the third party, the State.").
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married couples on the same basis as married couples.
III. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
Predicting with any certainty how a court might decide a case involving
the North Carolina Marriage Amendment is impossible. While a remote
possibility always exists that a rogue judge will issue a ruling that does not
follow traditional rules of legal interpretation, it is highly unlikely that the
Amendment will result in widespread invalidation of existing or future
North Carolina laws. Courts generally are reluctant to strike down laws as
unconstitutional. Under North Carolina law, it is well settled that "a statute
enacted by the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional.".s A
statute will not be declared unconstitutional "unless this conclusion is so
clear that no reasonable doubt can arise, or the statute cannot be upheld on
any reasonable ground.'16  When a judge has available a reasonable
construction of the Amendment's language which allows the law in
question to be upheld, there is little chance that he or she would choose an
"unintended" interpretation to strike the law down.
Opponents of the Amendment-including prominent legal
professionals-claimed that its passage would lead to a flood of litigation
over its meaning and application.117 That typically has not occurred in
other states with marriage amendments. For example, Idaho's marriage
amendment, which contains the same wording as the North Carolina
Marriage Amendment, was adopted in 2006.118 To date, some seven years
later, there has not been one reported appellate court decision clarifying the
amendment's meaning. The Eichner Paper's authors acknowledged as
much when they observed in late 2011 that "Idaho courts have yet to
interpret that statute."' 19 South Carolina also passed a marriage amendment
in 2006, which the Eichner Paper's authors say "approach[es] the breadth
of North Carolina's proposed language." 20 The authors again concede that
"[i]ts scope also has not yet been interpreted by South Carolina courts."1 21
Thus, there has been no court decision interpreting marriage amendments
in Idaho and South Carolina since their adoption in 2006, the former with
115. Wayne Cnty. Citizens Ass'n for Better Tax Control v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 399 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (N.C. 1991).
116. Id. (citing Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Stone, 366 S.E.2d 697, 698 (N.C. 1988)).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
118. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 (2006) ("Marriage between a man and a woman is
the only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this State.").
119. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 3.
120. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 75.
121. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 3.
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language exactly like the North Carolina Marriage Amendment and the
latter with language nearly as broad. In fact, no reported appellate
decisions involving marriage amendments are available in the majority of
the thirty other states that have these amendments. Despite unsubstantiated
claims that North Carolina's Marriage Amendment goes "far beyond" other
state marriage amendments,12 2 nothing suggests that North Carolina's
experience will be different than that of other states.
The only exception is Ohio, where extensive litigation occurred in lower
courts over whether that state's marriage amendment rendered existing
domestic violence laws unconstitutional. The Ohio Supreme Court
resolved the question by not applying the state's marriage amendment to its
domestic violence laws. While the same arguments made in Ohio's lower
courts might be made in some domestic violence cases in North Carolina,
the state's appellate courts, for reasons explained below, likely will resolve
the matter by following the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court.
North Carolina courts should construe the Amendment to apply only to
marriage and marriage imitations or substitutes, and not assign
unreasonably broad or bizarre interpretations to it. Nevertheless, I examine
below the likelihood of those "unintended consequences" urged by
Amendment opponents.
A. Domestic Violence Laws
Prior to the vote, critics frequently claimed that adoption of the North
Carolina Marriage Amendment could invalidate existing state domestic
violence laws protecting all unmarried women. They predicted that North
Carolina courts might apply the Amendment to strike down such laws, as
some lower courts did in Ohio after the passage of Ohio's marriage
amendment. Suzanne Reynolds, a family law professor at Wake Forest
University School of Law, said, "I'd be astounded if batterers failed to raise
that argument. And I'd be astounded if every District Court judge in the
state-how many are there, 200?-rejected that argument."' 23 She feared
that the Amendment would nullify such protections simply because the
victim has a "relationship other than marriage" with the attacker.124 "It is
not an illogical argument," she said, "I'm afraid it's very logical."l2 5
Shannon Gilreath, another Wake Forest law professor, made the same
prediction:
122. College Park Baptist Church, supra note 14, at 4:47.
123. Phillips, supra note 25 (quoting Suzanne Reynolds) (internal quotations
omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Suzanne Reynolds) (internal quotations omitted).
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Would you want to live in a North Carolina in which your daughter
could be beaten up or otherwise abused by her boyfriend but could not
obtain a domestic violence protective order restraining him? In Ohio,
where an anti-gay marriage amendment significantly more precise than
the proposed N.C. amendment passed in 2004, prosecutors and judges
interpreted the "pro-marriage" amendment to mean just that. Are you
willin 6to bet your daughter's life that the outcome would be different
here?
The Coalition to Protect N.C. Families, an organization opposing the
Amendment, ran a television advertisement featuring Amily McCool, an
assistant district attorney in North Carolina's Wake County, in which she
claimed that "Amendment One could take away protections for domestic
violence victims .. . who are unmarried to the person that's [sic] abusing
them."l 2 7 Showing a stack of photos of domestic violence victims, she
further declared that "[t]his is just a handful of the many, many, many
victims that [sic] could be affected." 2 8
There is little chance that the Amendment will invalidate existing North
Carolina domestic violence protections for unmarried couples. Such
protections do not require victims to have, or recognize them as having, a
marital or marital-like "union" with the offender. Additionally, the North
Carolina judiciary has the benefit of the Ohio experience and likely will not
repeat it.
While worded differently, Ohio's marriage amendment-like the North
Carolina Marriage Amendment-bars the state from creating or
recognizing same-sex marriage or any other marriage-like statuses, such as
civil unions or domestic partnerships, that approximate marriage. Compare
the language of the two provisions:
Ohio: "Only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political
subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that
intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage."12
North Carolina: "Marriage between one man and one woman is the only
126. Gilreath, supra note 15, at 2. Professor Gilreath neglected to mention that the
Ohio Supreme Court ultimately rejected the interpretation of Ohio's marriage
amendment held by the prosecutors and judges who denied the protective orders. See
State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007).
127. Coal. to Protect N.C. Families, Amily, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yJsBXd42-I.
128. Id.
129. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added).
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The meaning and legal effects of the two amendments are essentially the
same, given the meaning of the term "domestic legal union," as explained
in Part II above, and especially the Idaho legislature's statement describing
the "Effect of Adoption" of nearly identical language in its own state's
marriage amendment."' Both amendments bar same-sex marriage and any
legal relationship between unmarried persons that approximates marriage.
Initially in Ohio, several lower courts read Ohio's marriage amendment
to bar the state from giving any domestic violence protections to unmarried
partners. The confusion was created by language in the state's domestic
violence laws protecting an unmarried person "living as a spouse" with the
offender. Ohio's domestic violence law recognizes a large class of
potential domestic violence victims to whom the law offered protection:
spouse, person living as a spouse, former spouse, parent, child, blood
relative, in-law, parent of a spouse or former spouse, child of a spouse or
former spouse, blood relative of a spouse or in-law of a spouse or former
spouse, and natural parent of a child that also is the issue of the offender.13 2
Some lower courts held that giving protection to a "person living as a
spouse" (i.e., cohabiting) with the offender was unconstitutional under the
amendment because it conferred upon that person an effect of marriage.133
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Carswelll34 properly rejected that
interpretation of Ohio's marriage amendment and overruled those courts,
holding that the state's marriage amendment did not affect domestic
violence protections. The court noted that the first sentence in Ohio's
marriage amendment "prohibits the recognition of marriage between
persons other than one man and one woman."135  The second sentence
prohibits the state "from creating or recognizing a legal status deemed to be
the equivalent of a marriage of a man and a woman."' 36 The Ohio domestic
violence statute, the court said, only designated the cohabiting partner as
one member of a set of possible domestic violence victims-it did not treat
the partner as if he or she was married to the offender. The court
explained:
130. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
131. See supra text accompanying note 70.
132. OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.25(F) (2012).
133. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, In re
Ohio Domestic-Violence Statute Cases, 872 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 2007).
134. State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007).
135. Id. at 551.
136. Id
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[T]he term "person living as a spouse". . . merely identifies a particular
class of persons for the purposes of the domestic-violence statutes. It
does not create or recognize a legal relationship that approximates the
designs, qualities, or significance of marriage as prohibited by the
[marriage amendment]. Persons who satisfy the "living as a spouse"
category are not provided any of the rights, benefits, or duties of a
marriage. A "person living as a spouse" is simply a classification with
significance to only domestic-violence statutes. Thus, [the Ohio
domestic violence law] is not unconstitutional and does not create a
quasi-marital relationship in violation of the [marriage amendment]. 137
The court also noted that while the state has a role in creating marriage,
it does not create cohabitation-the cohabiting partner creates cohabitation
by the "determination to share some measure of life's responsibilities with
another."13 8
The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to the state's domestic
violence laws, similarly reasoning that the protection a person receives
under such laws is not predicated on the state recognizing that the person's
relationship with the offender is similar to conventional marriage.'39 The
Kansas marriage amendment limits marriage to one man and one woman
and bars the state from recognizing as valid any other relationships that
entitle the parties to the "rights or incidents of marriage," 40 which the court
interpreted to mean the "'bundle of rights' that identifies marriage as a
distinct and separate institution."l 4 1 The court held that the defendant's
conviction for domestic violence did not turn upon the state recognizing his
relationship with the victim as having the characteristics of conventional
marriage, but merely extended to the cohabiting victim the same protection
of the law granted to others-married or single-who, like the victim, were
particularly vulnerable to violence "due to their close proximity to or
relationship with the defendant."l 42
Opponents of North Carolina's Marriage Amendment seized upon the
temporary confusion in Ohio's lower courts to argue that the Amendment,
if passed, would threaten domestic violence protections for all unmarried
heterosexual couples in North Carolina. Professor Eichner, in fact,
suggested that it was more likely that North Carolina's domestic violence
protections would be overturned. She told Talking Points Memo that "[The
Ohio amendment] prohibits anything that 'approximates' marriage. Our
137. Id. at 554.
138. Id. at 553.
139. State v. Curreri, 213 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
140. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16.
141. Curreri, 213 P.3d at 1090.
142. Id.
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amendment is much broader. It says you can't recognize or validate these
relationships at all." 4 3 In an e-mail to Amendment opponents, Professor
Eichner explained:
[T]he Ohio Supreme Court ruled that domestic violence protections for
unmarried couples did not violate the Ohio amendment. It did that,
however, based on the narrower language of the Ohio amendment, which
barred the state only from recognizing a legal status that "approximates"
marriage. Our amendment's language, though, bars any recognition of
"domestic legal unions," not simply those that approximate marriage. If
a North Carolina court applied the same rationale as the Ohio Supreme
Court to our amendment's language, domestic violence protections for
unmarried partners would be struck down.'"
According to Professor Eichner, a "domestic legal union" encompasses
all relationships between unmarried couples, not just those that
approximate marriage. But, as explained in Part I above, that is not what
the term "domestic legal union" means. The Amendment bars validation or
recognition of any legal union other than heterosexual marriage. A "union"
is a marriage or marriage-like relationship, but not any relationship
between two unmarried persons.
There is every reason to believe that North Carolina courts, if presented
with the question, will follow the same reasoning as the Ohio Supreme
Court and hold that the state's domestic violence laws do not violate the
North Carolina Marriage Amendment. North Carolina law defines
"domestic violence" for purposes of both civil protections afforded victims
and various criminal offenses as the commission of certain specified acts
(e.g., attempted or actual bodily injury, causing fear of imminent serious
bodily injury, stalking, sexual assault) by a person with whom the victim
has or has had a "personal relationship."l 4 5  The term "personal
relationship" is defined as a relationship in which the parties are: (1)
current or former spouses, (2) persons of the opposite sex who live together
or have lived together, (3) related as parents and children, or grandparents
and grandchildren, including persons acting in loco parentis to a minor
child, (4) persons who have a child in common, (5) current or former
household members, and (6) persons of the opposite sex who are in a
dating relationship or have been in a dating relationship.14 6 North Carolina
courts have applied the "household members" category to unmarried same-
143. Kludt, supra note 21 (quoting Professor Eichner).
144. Carlos Maza, NC Law Professor Corrects the Record: Amendment One Could
'Invalidate'Domestic Violence Protections, EQUAL. MATrERS (May 2, 2012, 3:31 PM),
http://equalitymatters.org/blog/201205020005 (quoting e-mail from Professor Eichner).
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(a) (2009).
146. § 50B-l(b).
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sex couples and categories (2), (4), and (6) to unmarried opposite-sex
couples.14 7 Domestic violence victims may sue their abusers with whom
they have or have had a "personal relationship" for a domestic protection
order.148 Such orders, which can be issued ex parte in an emergency, are
enforced by both criminal process and civil contempt against persons
accused of physical abuse, serious threats of abuse, stalking, or sexual
assault. 149
The wording of North Carolina's domestic violence statutes makes it less
likely that what happened in the lower courts in Ohio will happen in North
Carolina. Unlike Ohio law, North Carolina statutes do not use the category
of persons "living as a spouse," and therefore are not susceptible to the
same arguments that persuaded some Ohio lower court judges.'50 They
protect broader categories of potential victims than protected under Ohio
law by focusing on personal relationships, rather than marital or marital-
like relationships. As detailed above, North Carolina domestic violence
statutes apply to a wide range of persons, including those who are living
together, household members, and even couples who are dating, whose
status under those laws does not depend upon having a marital or marital-
like union with the offender.' 5' Unmarried couples do not have to meet
criteria creating or recognizing a status similar to marriage to qualify for
protection under the law; in fact, the law distinguishes them categorically
from current or former spouses.
The North Carolina Marriage Amendment only bars recognition of
domestic legal unions, not every relationship between unmarried couples.
Protecting unmarried couples who are dating or living together, or who
have had a child together, does not confer on them the legal status of a
domestic union and grant them any of the benefits, rights, and obligations
of marriage (e.g., spousal support, inheritance rights, or the marital
privilege). Put differently, simply acknowledging the fact that two persons
are dating or living together for purposes of domestic violence laws does
not recognize or validate a legal status that constitutes or closely resembles
marriage. Thus, opposite-sex and same-sex couples in North Carolina
147. See Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 14; see also Eatmon v. Safferman, 578
S.E.2d 328 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
148. § 50B-1 to 50B-4.
149. § 50B-2(c).
150. Although North Carolina courts are not required to follow the decisions of
other state courts, they often rely on those decisions when deciding questions of first
impression. See, e.g., Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 716 S.E.2d 836, 842 (N.C.
2011). The Ohio Supreme Court's decision should put the issue to rest. See State v.
Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007).
151. § 50B-1.
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should not lose any protections under the state's domestic violence laws.
B. Domestic Partner Benefits
Whether the North Carolina Marriage Amendment bars public
employers from offering insurance benefits to their employees'
heterosexual or homosexual domestic partners depends on how the
partnership is defined. The Michigan Supreme Court held that such
benefits were prohibited by the state's marriage amendment in National
Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan,'52 the leading case on the
issue, but the insurance benefits there were premised upon recognition of a
narrowly-defined status ("domestic partner") that was substantially similar
to marriage. If the beneficiary class that includes domestic partners is
defined in a way that does not create or recognize a status similar to
marriage, the North Carolina Marriage Amendment should not prevent
public employers from offering such coverage.
The insurance policies in National Pride at Work required that a couple
meet certain criteria to qualify as "domestic partners" entitled to benefits
under the policies. For example, they were required to be of the same
gender as the other partner, and they could not be related by blood in a
manner that would bar their marriage to one another.153 The court observed
that "[a]lthough there are . .. many different types of relationships in
Michigan that are accorded legal significance-e.g., debtor-creditor,
parent-child, landlord-tenant, attorney-client, employer-employee-
marriages and domestic partnerships appear to be the only such
relationships that are defined in terms of both gender and the lack of a close
blood connection."15 4
The National Pride at Work court noted other similarities between
marriage and the criteria for domestic partners under the policies.
Domestic partnerships were relationships that only two persons could enter.
The partners were prohibited from having another domestic partner
relationship within the previous six months. They were required to
undertake obligations of mutual support, have a partnership contract, be at
least eighteen years old, continue indefinitely in the partnership until one of
the partners takes affirmative action to terminate, and share a common
residence. 55 One of the policies specifically stated that it was intended "to
provide insurance coverage and other benefits to domestic partners . ..
identical to those provided to spouses of City employees," and the other
152. 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
153. Id. at 535.
154. Id. at 535-36.
155. Id. at 536 n.14.
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policies also invoked marriage as an analogous or comparable
relationship.156
Michigan's marriage amendment states "the union of one man and one
woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or
similar union for any purpose."157 In National Pride at Work, the court
addressed whether Michigan public employers were recognizing domestic
partnerships as a union similar to marriage for the purpose of providing
employee health insurance benefits. Given the features that domestic
partnerships, as defined by the insurance policies, held in common with
marriages, the court concluded that "domestic partnerships are unions
similar to marriage," 58 and thus the recognition of such partnership
agreements in the insurance policies violated the marriage amendment:
[G]iven that the marriage amendment prohibits the recognition of unions
similar to marriage "for any purpose," the pertinent question is not
whether these unions give rise to all of the same legal effects; rather, it is
whether these unions are being recognized as unions similar to marriage
"for any purpose." Recognizing this and concluding that these unions
are indeed being recognized as similar unions "for any purpose," the
Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm its judgment. That is, we
conclude that the marriage amendment ... prohibits public employers
from providing health-insurance benefits to their employees' qualified
same-sex domestic partners.' 5 9
The Kentucky Attorney General reached the same conclusion as the
156. Id. at 537n.15.
157. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
158. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 537.
159. Id. at 543 (footnote omitted). Several earlier challenges to county and
municipal policies granting benefits to domestic partners turned upon the question of
whether those entities were authorized under state law to grant such benefits. See, e.g.,
Tyma v. Montgomery Co., 801 A.2d 148 (Md. 2002); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver,
29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999); Schaefer v. City of Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. App. 1998). For a lower court
decision contrary to National Pride at Work, see Leskovar v. Nickels, 166 P.3d 1251
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007), rev. denied, 187 P.3d 270 (Wash. 2008) (distinguishing
National Pride at Work and holding that executive order granting domestic partner
benefits does not give legal effect to same-sex marriages in violation of state law
prohibiting same-sex marriage, even though order contained language in its "whereas"
clauses stating that "marriage equality" should be afforded to all consenting, adult
couples regardless of their sexual orientation), and Lowe v. Broward County, 766
So.2d 1199, 1205-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a county ordinance
granting benefits to domestic partners, defined as both being at least 18 years old,
freely consenting to the partnership, and agreeing to be responsible for each other's
basic food and shelter, and neither being married, in another domestic partner
relationship, or related by blood, is not unconstitutional under state marriage
amendment because it does not create a "new marriage-like relationship").
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Michigan Supreme Court in National Pride at Work when asked whether a
state university's offering health insurance coverage for "domestic
partners" of its employees violated the Kentucky marriage amendment.16 0
The insurance policies at issue in Kentucky defined eligibility for coverage
as a "domestic partner" to include criteria such as not being currently
married to or legally separated from another person, being at least eighteen
years of age and mentally competent, and not being related by blood to a
degree that would prohibit legal marriage. The Attorney General's opinion
observes that "[a]ll of these criteria ... expressly define 'domestic partner'
in terms closely resembling the legal conditions for the status of
marriage." 6' One of the policies also required "living together as a
couple." The opinion adds that "if 'living together as a couple' (emphasis
added) is recognized as part of a legal status for unmarried individuals, in
conjunction with the other elements resembling marriage [identified
above], it further indicates an intent on the part of the university to
recognize an imitation or substitute for marriage." 6 2  The opinion
concludes:
The contours of the definition, far from suggesting a broad and inclusive
availability of health insurance for a bona fide member of the
employee's household, instead indicate a narrowly focused attempt to
recognize in "domestic partnership" an imitation or substitute for the
marital relationship. In effect, the universities have placed
unconstitutional conditions on health insurance coverage for domestic
partners, since the benefit is premised upon the recognition of a legal
status in the two individuals that is substantially similar to marriage.
The reasoning used by the Michigan Supreme Court and Kentucky
Attorney General does not bar public employers from covering domestic
partners in a way that does not define their relationship in terms of a status
160. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen., No. OAG 07-004, 2007 WL 1625297, at *11 (June 1,
2007).
161. Id. at *7.
162. Id. at *8. The opinion further notes that the additional requirements of
exclusivity and quasi-permanence (being each other's sole domestic partner and
intending to remain so indefinitely), when taken together with other elements of the
definition of that relationship which already bore a substantial resemblance to the legal
status of marriage, "merely serve as added indicia of the recognition of a similar legal
status." Id. at *9.
163. Id. at *10. Although focusing primarily on what constitutes "recognition" of a
status that approximates marriage, the Idaho Attorney General used essentially the
same reasoning to conclude that a city could not extend health care benefits to the
domestic partners of its employees. For a copy of the opinion, see Idaho Op. Att'y
Gen., No. 08-21508 (Feb. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/UserDocs/IdahoAGOpinion.pdf.
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similar to marriage. The Kentucky Attorney General's opinion explains:
If "domestic partner" were defined in a more general manner, not so
delimited as to resemble a tailored alternative to the legal status of
marriage, there would be nothing in [Kentucky's marriage amendment]
to prevent Kentucky's public universities from offering this coverage.
Alternatively, the universities could elect to offer health insurance
benefits to all of an employee's dependents, or to use any other approach
that would not involve the unconstitutional recognition of a legal status
resembling that of marriage.16
The National Pride at Work decision did not end health insurance
benefits offered to same-sex partners of public employees in Michigan.
Public employers simply revised their health insurance plans to extend
benefits to beneficiaries not defined by marriage-like criteria such as
"domestic partners."l 6 5  The University of Michigan's current health
insurance plan provides benefits to "Other Qualified Adults" (OQA), who
share a primary residence with the employee and have done so for the
previous six months.166 Michigan State University's current plan grants
benefits to an "Other Eligible Individual" (OEI), who is defined as a person
who currently resides in the employee's residence and has lived there for
the past eighteen months, who is not a "dependent" of the employee as
defined by the IRS, and who is ineligible to inherit from the employee
under the state's intestate succession laws.16 7
At least one court has approved similar plans that extended employee
benefits to same-sex partners of public employees. The court in In re Utah
164. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen., No. OAG 07-004, at *10.
165. See, e.g., Gilia C. Smith, Same-Sex Marriage Bans' Effects on Public
Universities' Benefits, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (July 24, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/article-content/128379.
166. Univ. of Mich. Benefits Office, Benefits Eligibility-Other Qualified Adults
(OQA), U. OF MICH., http://www.benefits.umich.edu/eligibility/oqa.html (last visited
July 6, 2013). The OQA cannot be the employee's child, grandchild, parent, sibling,
niece, nephew, grandparent, aunt, uncle, cousin, renter, boarder, tenant, or employee.
167. Mich. State Univ. Human Res., Other Eligible Individual, MICH. ST. U.,
http://www.hr.msu.edu/benefits/oei.htm (last visited July 6, 2013). The OEI cannot be
the employee's spouse, children, grandchildren, parent, sibling, niece, nephew,
grandparent, aunt, uncle, cousin, renter, boarder, or tenant. In 2011, Michigan enacted
the Public Employees Domestic Partner Benefit Restriction Act (PEDPBRA), which
prohibits public employers (excluding public universities) from providing medical or
other fringe benefits to an individual currently residing in the same residence of a
public employee who is not either married to the employee, a dependent of the
employee, or a person eligible to inherit from the employee under the state intestate
succession laws. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.581-.585. The ACLU filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of the law in 2012. See Bassett v. Snyder, No. 12-
10038, 2013 WL 3285111 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2013).
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State Retirement Board's Trustee Duties'6 8 held that a public employer's
plan that provided benefits to an "Adult Designee" of the public employee
does not violate the Utah marriage amendment. The "Adult Designee"
beneficiary was defined under the plan as "a person, not the spouse of the
employee, who resides in the domicile of the eligible employee for not less
than twelve consecutive months and intends to continue to do so, is at least
eighteen years old, and is economically dependent on or interdependent
with the eligible employee." 6 9 The Utah Constitution states "[m]arriage
consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. No other
domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or
given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect."170  The court
concluded that conferring this benefit did not make the relationship
between the employee and the adult designee "substantially equivalent" in
its legal effect to marriage.'71
Whether North Carolina or its local government subdivisions can offer
employee benefits to same-sex partners turns upon whether the beneficiary
designation creates a legal status that approximates marriage. To the extent
that North Carolina courts follow National Pride at Work, they will focus
on similarities between the eligibility criteria for marriage and for plan
beneficiaries. Several local government entities in North Carolina continue
to grant domestic partner benefits after adoption of the North Carolina
Marriage Amendment. Both Mecklenburg County and the City of
Greensboro define a "domestic partner" as one who lives in a "spousal-
like" relationship with the public employee.172 The cities of Charlotte,
Chapel Hill, and Durham also grant domestic partner benefits, but omit the
"spousal-like" language. Their requirements vary, but include
requirements that the domestic partners be at least eighteen years old, share
a common residence for a certain period of time, have a long-term
relationship, not be married or related by blood, and be jointly responsible
for each other's financial obligations. 7 3  The provision of benefits to
domestic partners by these county and municipal insurance policies could
be considered an unconstitutional recognition of a "domestic legal union"
under the Amendment. The safest course for these local government units
is to revise their policies to (1) delete any references to "domestic partner"
and "spousal-like" relationships, and (2) define the beneficiary category in
168. No. 050916879, 2006 WL 5711482 (D. Utah May 11, 2006).
169. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
170. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
171. In re Utah State Ret. Bd. 's Tr. Duties, 2006 WL 5711482, at *4.
172. Copies of these current benefits policies are on file with the author.
173. Copies of these current benefits policies are on file with the author.
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a way that does not include unique marriage-like attributes or eligibility
criteria (i.e., no prohibition on blood relations, no gender requirements,
etc.). With such revisions, the policies should be constitutional under the
Amendment.
The Amendment does not prevent private employers from extending
health insurance benefits to domestic partners, no matter how those
relationships are defined. It specifically provides that it "does not prohibit
a private party from entering into contracts with another private party, nor
does this section prohibit courts from adjudicating the rights of private
parties pursuant to such contracts."l 74 Private employers remain free to
recognize and provide employee benefits to same-sex couples, if they so
choose.1s
C. Child Custody, Adoption, and Visitation Laws
The North Carolina Marriage Amendment likely will not alter the state's
custody, adoption, and visitation laws for unmarried parents. To begin
with, the Amendment does not change the "best interests of the child"
standard'76 that North Carolina courts use for determining custody and
visitation. The Amendment defines permitted and prohibited legal unions
between adults and does not attempt to regulate relationships between
adults and children.
The Amendment also does not attach any legal consequences to
cohabitation. Under North Carolina law, a parent's cohabitation is not a
factor in custody determinations unless it can be shown to have an adverse
impact on the child.'7 7 The Eichner Paper's authors argue that "judges may
interpret [the Amendment] as an expression of public policy against all
non-marital relationships" and use the fact that a parent is living with a
same-sex or opposite-sex partner without being married to them as a reason
174. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
175. Ironically, a state's legalization of same-sex marriage actually may narrow the
number of gay couples who receive same-sex partner benefits. For example, after
Minnesota legalized same-sex marriage, the Mayo Clinic told employees who were
receiving same-sex domestic partner benefits that they would have to get married to
continue receiving those benefits. See Heather J. Carlson, Mayo Clinic Employees
Must Marry to Keep Getting Same-Sex Partner Benefits, PosT-BULLETIN (Aug. 2,
2013), http://www.postbulletin.com/news/politics/mayo-clinic-employees-must-marry-
to-keep-getting-same-sex/article_3e71cbda-ec99-5530-acOb-fd99501e064f.html.
176. See generally SUZANNE REYNOLDS, LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §
13.3 (5th ed. 2002).
177. See Williford v. Williford, 277 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. 1981); Browning v. Helff, 524
S.E.2d 95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
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to deny the parent custody or visitation. The Amendment's plain
language, however, does not disapprove of cohabitation nor make illegal
any non-marital relationship; rather, it preserves traditional opposite-sex
marriage and bars the state from creating or recognizing alternate legal
statuses for unmarried couples that resemble marriage. Simply
acknowledging the fact that two persons are living together does not create
or recognize a legal status that resembles marriage. 7 9
The Eichner Paper's authors argue that the Amendment could bar
application of the best-interest test to custody or visitation disputes between
an unmarried parent and nonparent in cases such as Boseman v. Jarrell,"so
where the parent gives up her paramount parental status by creating a
family unit with the non-parent in which the non-parent also acts as a
parent of the child.' 8' These cases, however, turn upon recognition of a "de
facto" parent status between the non-parent and the child, and not upon the
existence of any marriage-like status between the parent and non-parent.
Boseman involved a same-sex couple. The North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld awarding the former partner joint custody with the biological
mother. If approving the use of the best-interest test in this case depended
upon treating the same-sex couple as if they were married, then the court
could have held that public policy bars such an outcome, since same-sex
marriage is prohibited by state statute.182 The court did not so hold, and
there is no reason to believe that it would rule differently now. Thus, under
the Amendment, the custody and visitation rights of same-sex partners in
circumstances similar to Boseman should remain unaffected.
D. Other Legal Benefits and Protections
Will the Amendment limit protections for unmarried couples by
restricting hospital visitation privileges, emergency medical decisions, end-
of-life decisions, financial decisions, or the ability to grant their partners
property through a will or trust? No, so long as the unmarried couple's
privileges, decisions, or other benefits are not based on the creation or
recognition of a legal status that treats them as if they are spouses. As
North Carolina has done with its domestic violence laws, the state can
provide such rights or privileges to unmarried partners by including them in
178. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 19.
179. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
180. 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010).
181. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 20.
182. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1 (2012) ("A valid and sufficient marriage is created
by the consent of a male and female person who may lawfully marry, presently to take
each other as husband and wife. . . .").
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classes or categories of persons that are not defined by criteria or a status
resembling marriage. Thus, North Carolina can add unmarried partners to
existing lists of persons who can be given hospital visitation privileges,
designated as surrogate medical decision makers, and appointed to
administer estates.1 83
While conceding that such a result would be "far-reaching," the Eichner
Paper's authors claim that a court might refuse to enforce a will or trust that
"arose from an unmarried cohabitant relationship that constituted a
'domestic legal union' other than marriage," especially if "the will or trust
made clear on its face that it was based on a non-marital relationship."' 84
This view depends on the unfounded claim that the Amendment applies to
any non-marital relationship, not just legal unions that constitute or
resemble marriage.
There is almost no chance that the Amendment will interfere with
unmarried couples' ability to grant their partners property through a will or
trust. For such a "far-reaching" outcome to occur, two things must happen.
First, someone would have to object to the transfer of property to the
unmarried partner. Most interested parties typically know about and
respect the transferor's wishes and do not attempt to use the courts to
substitute their own preferences for those of the transferor. Second, if there
is such an objection, a court would have to refuse to enforce the will or
trust provision in favor of the cohabitant because such a transfer would
violate public policy. North Carolina law provides no basis to assert that a
court, when faced with an objection to a transfer in favor of a cohabitant,
would refuse to enforce the terms of the transfer because the transfer to the
cohabitant would violate the public policy of North Carolina. As the
Eichner Paper points out, North Carolina courts repeatedly have affirmed a
testator's freedom of testation 18 5-the ability to dispose of one's property
as one wishes. There are two public policy exceptions to that principle,
both statutorily provided. The first is the so-called "Slayer Statute" which
prevents from enforcement a provision in a will in favor of one who
willfully and unlawfully takes the life of the testator.18 6 The public policy
justification for this is that a wrongdoer should not profit from his or her
wrongdoing. The second exception to freedom of testation is the "Elective
Share" statute,' 87 which effectively prevents a testator from disinheriting a
surviving spouse.
183. See the hypothetical and explanation accompanying notes 102-04.
184. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 24.
185. Id. at 26 (citing Clark v. Conner, 253 N.C. 515, 520 (1960)).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -12.1 (2012).
187. §§ 30-3.1 to -3.6.
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No North Carolina court has refused to enforce on public policy grounds
a transfer provision in favor of a cohabitant. That likely will not change
under North Carolina's Marriage Amendment. First, the Amendment
arguably does not alter the public policy of North Carolina; instead, it
simply makes it explicit. North Carolina has never given legal recognition
to same-sex marriage or marriage substitutes or alternatives, and yet no
state court has struck down a transfer in favor of a cohabitant as violating
public policy. Second, the Amendment itself affirms that it "does not
prohibit a private party from entering into contracts with another private
party; nor does this section prohibit courts from adjudicating the rights of
private parties pursuant to such contracts." 8 8 There is no reason to assume
that testamentary freedom would not be accorded the same or even greater
protection than contractual freedom.
The Eichner Paper's authors concede that such an interpretation of the
Amendment "could have nonsensical results, such as invalidating wills and
trusts naming an unmarried partner as a beneficiary, but upholding identical
conveyances that name a dog or cat as the primary beneficiary." 89
Fortunately, North Carolina courts do not seek to interpret the meaning of
legal texts in ways that lead to nonsensical results.' 90
IV. CONCLUSION
Amendment opponents began with a premise that they could not prove,
namely, that the Amendment will apply broadly to all unmarried couples in
North Carolina, whether opposite-sex or same-sex. The critical flaw in
their projections was the failure to recognize the limiting effect of the term
"union" in the Amendment. In the Amendment's immediate and broader
legal context, the term "domestic legal union" refers to marriage or a legal
status resembling marriage. It does not alter or affect the legal status of
unmarried persons who are cohabiting, roommates, dating, or just friends.
It permits the state to extend a variety of legal benefits and protections to
unmarried couples so long as, in doing so, the state does not treat them as if
they are spouses. This understanding of the Amendment's meaning and
effect suggests that it is highly doubtful that the worst-case scenario
predicted by many legal experts will ever appear. The widespread alarm
about the Amendment's "unintended consequences" only served to obscure
a more substantive and meaningful debate about marriage equality-an
opportunity lost that may not occur again for several years.
188. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
189. Eichner Paper, supra note 13, at 26.
190. See, e.g., In re A.C.F., 626 S.E.2d 729, 733 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
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